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COOPERATIVE HOUSING SHARES: A
SECURITY OR SUBSTANTIVELY SECURE?
Cooperative housing developments' historically have been plagued
by fast-buck promoters, "sweetheart" leases,2 ineffective tenant
1. In a typical cooperative apartment project, tenants own shares in a corporation that
holds title to the building. Ownership of shares entitles the holder to a lease, usually
long-term, for a particular unit. Tenants pay monthly charges based on a prorated share of
mortgage loan payments, maintenance costs and management expenses. See P. ROHAN &
M. RESKIN, COOPERATIVE HOUSING LAW & PRACTICE §§ 1.01-.03, 2.01(4) (1974) [hereinaf-
ter cited as ROHAN]; Miller, Cooperative Apartments: Real Estate or Securities?, 45
B.U.L. REV. 465, 466 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Miller].
Condominium owners, on the other hand, hold their individual units in fee simple, while
common areas are typically held in joint tenancy. This arrangement, which required state
enabling legislation because of the common law prohibition against fee simple ownership
of horizontal spaces, is more akin to ownership of a single family home. See ROHAN,
supra. § 1.02(3).
The distinction in form of ownership can be very important to purchasers. Fee simple
ownership of condominiums allows individual owners to pledge a mortgage on their
property. Id. § 1.02(0), (3). Cooperatives are typically financed by a blanket mortgage,
covering the entire project, in which the corporate owner is the mortgagor. Id. § 1.02(3).
Thus, shareholders in a cooperative are dependent on their fellow tenants for financial
support; if one shareholder defaults on his payments, the corporation must make up the
deficit by assessing other cooperative shareholders. In a condominium project, however,
only the common areas are paid for by the tenants as a group. Default by a single tenant, or
even several tenants, is much less likely to jeopardize the financing of an entire project.
For a discussion of the difference between the two forms of community apartment
ownership see id.; Note, Community Apartments: Condominiums or Stock Coopera-
tives?, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 299 (1962).
During the 1970's condominiums have far surpassed cooperatives in number of units,
largely because of the availability of mortgage loans on individual units. 1 U.S. DEP-rOF
HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT, CONDOMINIUM/COOPERATIVE STUDY 111-2 (1975)
(hereinafter cited as HUD REPORT]. It was estimated that there were 439,000 units in
cooperative projects and 1,252,000 units in condominium projects in 1975. Id. Eighty
percent of the cooperative units were built before 1970; by contrast, 86% of the con-
dominium units were built after that date. Id. Nonetheless, cooperatives remain important
segments of the housing market in selected urban areas. In New York City alone, there are
more than 141,000 units in cooperatives. 2 HUD REPORT, supra, appendix C, at 12.
2. In a "sweetheart" lease, a developer will transfer title to one portion of the
development to the tenants while retaining another portion that is leased back to the
tenants, sometimes at an inflated price. Typically, such leases have involved retention of
land upon which the building sits or retention of certain recreational properties. Note,
Condominium Regulation: Beyond Disclosure, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 639, 643 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Condominium Regulation].
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associations and understated cost estimates. 3 Because of the form of
ownership, purchasers of shares in cooperative housing corporations
often must rely on developers and fellow shareholders to protect their
investment. 4 This dependency and recurring abuses have led to various
proposals for consumer-oriented regulation. 5 Most discussion has cen-
tered on whether cooperative interests are protected by existing state
and federal securities laws. 6
In United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman,7 the United States
Supreme Court held8 that shares in a nonprofit cooperative housing
corporation subsidized by the State of New York were not "securities"
within the definitions of the Securities Act of 19339 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.10 The Court dismissed for lack of a federal
question claims by 57 residents of the massive Co-op City in New York
City who were seeking damages and forced rent reduction" under the
3. For ageneral discussion of the historical problems of cooperative housing ventures
see Marks & Marks, Coercive Aspects of Housing Cooperatives, 42 ILL. L. REv. 728,730
n.7 (1948); Miller, supra note 1, at 466-67; Note, Cooperative Housing Corporations and
the Federal Securities Laws, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 118, 120-22 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Cooperative Housing Corporations]; Note, Co-operative Apartment Housing, 61
HARV. L. REv. 1407, 1407-08 & n.9 (1948).
4. See note I supra.
5. The commentators differ on which level of government, federal or state, should
promulgate and enforce such regulations. Professor Miller argues for state regulation of
cooperatives based, in part, on inclusion of cooperative interests within the state Blue Sky
provisions. He also favors substantive regulation of such factors as the length of time a
developer may control a project without passing ownership and management on to the
tenants. Miller, supra note 1, at 504-05. Others have argued that the federal securities
statutes are the proper vehicle for regulation. See Zammit, Securities Law Aspects of
Cooperative Apartments, N.Y.L. J., Jan. 8, 1973, at 1, col. I ("[t]he breadth and flexibility
of the federal securities laws make their application to the cooperative housing area not
only possible, but particularly well-suited in the curbing of abuses. . . . mhe present
criminal sanctions and civil liability provisions are sufficiently stringent to insure a high
degree of compliance."); Note, Cooperative Housing Corporations, supra note 3, at
122-26. But see Note, Condominium Regulation, supra note 2, at 643 (suggesting that the
protection afforded by securities laws is not appropriate for community apartment inter-
ests and advocating a federal scheme of substantive regulation attacking specific abuses,
coupled with statutorily defined full disclosure provisions, id. at 646, 662-65; the abuses
discussed by the commentator are in connection with condominiums but parallel those
applicable to cooperatives, id. at 642-43).
6. See note 5 supra.
7. 421 U.S. 837 (1975), aff'g sub nom. Forman v. Community Servs., Inc., 366 F.
Supp. 1117 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 500 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974).
8. 421 U.S. at 859-60.
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1970).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1970).
11. 421 U.S. at 844. Interests in a cooperative housing corporation are specifically
included in the definition of a security under New York's Blue Sky Law, N.Y. GEN. Bus.
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broad anti-fraud provisions 12 of the federal securities acts.
The decision raises two important issues.1 3 The first is whether the
Court departed from the remedial nature of the securities acts in failing
to find that shares of a cooperative housing corporation were securities.
The second is whether state and federal securities laws would provide
effective consumer protection for cooperative shareholders.
Co-op City is a 15,000-unit cooperative apartment project in the
Bronx. About 50,000 persons live in the 25 high-rise buildings and 236
townhouses.1 4 The project was organized, 15 financed and built under
New York's Mitchell-Lama Act, 16 which provided long-term, low-
interest loans to cooperative housing projects.17 Under the statute, only
low and moderate income families were eligible to purchase shares of
the cooperative and to occupy units in the project. Is Shares were sold at
$25 each and tenants were required to purchase 18 shares for each room
occupied.19 The shares could not be resold at a profit and a tenant selling
his shares was required to offer them for resale to the corporation.20
LAW § 352-e(l)(a) (McKinney 1968). However, plaintiffs may have been barred in the state
courts by Schumann v. 250 Tenants Corp., 65 Misc. 2d 253, 317 N.Y.S.2d 500 (Sup. Ct.
1970) (permitting limited review of attorney general's decision on sufficiency of the
prospectus).
12. Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77a(a) (1970); Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970); see SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1976). The federal anti-fraud provisions are significantly broader than common law fraud.
3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1430-45 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss]; cf.
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 685-86 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS H 525-48 (1938). Fraud, under the securities laws, may be found when there is an
omission of a material fact, and recovery neither depends on defendant's mental state nor
plaintiff's reliance. 3 Loss, supra at 1430-45.
13. A third issue is whether other community apartment projects, without the peculiar
nonprofit features of Co-op City, would be considered securities. See note 48 infra.
14. 421 U.S. at 840.
15. Co-op City was sponsored by United Housing Foundation (UHF), a nonprofit
corporation composed of labor unions, housing cooperatives and civic groups. Id. at 841
n.2. Riverbay, a nonprofit cooperative housing corporation, was organized by UHF to
own and operate Co-op City. Tenants held shares of Riverbay. Id. at 842. The contract to
construct the massive project was between UHF and its wholly owned subsidiary,
Community Services, Inc. As required by statute, all arrangements were approved by the
State Housing Commissioner. Id.
16. N.Y. PRIV. Hous. FIN. LAW H 10-37 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
17. Id. § 22(2).
18. Id. § 31(2)(a). Families were eligible for projects organized under the Mitchell-
Lama Act if their anticipated annual income for the period of occupancy did not exceed six
times the annual rental, including utilities. For families with three or more dependents, the
ratio was seven to one. Id.
19. 421 U.S. at 842.
20. N.Y. PRIV. Hous. FIN. LAW § 31-a (McKinney Supp. 1974). The seller, however,
could recover a proportionate share of the amortized principal payments. Id.
1976]
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About $32,000,000 of the total project cost of $408,700,000 was raised
by the sale of shares to tenants.2'
Plaintiffs charged defendants 22 with violation of the anti-fraud provi-
sions of the federal securities acts in connection with several major
increases in the tenants' monthly charge. The increases were attribu-
table to construction cost overruns and rising maintenance and manage-
ment expenses. By 1974, three years after the project was completed,
monthly charges were nearly double the estimates made in 1965 when
the first subscriptions were solicited. 23
The definition of a security in the securities acts includes the term
"stock." 24 Plaintiffs argued that shares in Co-op City were called stock
and represented an equity interest in a corporation; therefore, such
shares should be included in the literal definition of a security. 25 The
Court rejected this approach, quoting from Tcherepnin v. Knight:26 "In
searching for the meaning and scope of the word 'security' in the Act,
form should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on
economic reality." 27 The reality, the Court said, was that Co-op City
21. When organized, the estimated cost of construction was $283,700,000. Increased
construction costs led to several upward revisions of the construction contract and to
increases in the mortgage loans, all of which were approved by the State Housing
Commissioner. 421 U.S. at 843.
22. Defendants were UHF, Riverbay, Community Services, Inc., the State of New
York, the New York Private Housing Finance Agency and several directors of the
corporate defendants. Id. at 842. In addition to violations of the securities acts, plaintiffs
presented a claim against the state agency under42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) (civil remedies for
violation of civil rights under color of state law). That claim was dismissed by the district
court for not being well-pleaded. Forman v. Community Servs., Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1117.
1132 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See 421 U.S. at 845-46 & n. 10. Ten pendant state law claims were
also alleged. Id. at 845.
23. Seenote 21 supra. By 1974 the average monthly cost for a four-room apartment was
$170. The 1965 Information Bulletin, designed to solicit subscriptions, had estimated the
cost at $92. 421 U.S. at 843.
24. The Securities Act of 1933, § 2(l) defines a security as:
any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certifi-
cate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, . . . transferable
share, investment contract, . . . certificate of deposit for a security, . . . or, in
general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a "security," or any
certificate of interest or parti6ipation in, temporary or interim certificate for, guaran-
tee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970) (emphasis added). The definition in the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(I0) (1970), is virtually identical and the Supreme Court
has said that the two definitions may be considered the same. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389
U.S. 332, 336, 342 (1967).
25. 421 U.S. at 848.
26. 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
27. Id. at 336.
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shares lacked the essential characteristics of stock, in particular, "the
right to receive 'dividends contingent upon an apportionment of
profits.' "28
An "investment contract" is also defined as a security under the
acts. 29 The reach of this term has been the subject of much litigation and
critical commentary.30 In 1946 the Supreme Court in SEC v. W.J. Howey
Co.31 defined an investment contract as "a contract, transaction, or
scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and
is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third
party."132 In Howey, the Court found that the sale of land in a citrus
grove, coupled with a management contract, was an investment con-
tract for purposes of the securities acts' definition. 33
The Howey definition has been under fire for the last decade as being
too restrictive.3 4 On occasion, courts have abandoned the Howey test in
favor of a broader, more flexible definition. 35 Other courts have strained
28. 421 U.S. at 851, quoting Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. at 339. The Court also
noted that the shares were not negotiable, could not be pledged, conferred no voting rights
in proportion to the number of shares owned, and did not appreciate in value. 421 U.S. at
851.
29. See note 24 supra.
30. See, e.g., Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More
Meaningful Formula ? 18 W. RES. L. REV. 367,374-78 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Coffey];
Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of Securities
Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 135, 139-46 (1971); Note, What Is a "Security"?, 1974
WASH. U.L.Q. 815, 815-16, 830-31.
31. 328 U.S. 293 (1946). The Forman Court recognized that the term "solely" in the
Howey test has been the subject of much recent discussion. 421 U.S. at 852 n. 16; seenotes
34-35 infra. But the Court gave no opinion on whether the term should be given broader
reach than its literal meaning. 421 U.S. at 852 n.16.
32. 328 U.S. at 298-99.
33. Id.
34. For example, the Hawaii Supreme Court has criticized the "solely" requirement of
the Howey test:
The primary weakness of the Howey formula is that it has led courts to analyse [sic]
investment projects mechanically, based on a narrow concept of investor participa-
tion.. . . Thus courts become entrapped in polemics over the meaning of the word
.solely" and fail to consider the more fundamental question whether the statutory
policy of affording broad protection to investors should be applied even to those
situations where an investor is not inactive, but participates to a limited degree in the
operation of the business ...
State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 647, 485 P.2d 105, 108-09 (1971). See
generally note 30 supra.
35. See, e.g., State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971)
(adopting the Coffey formula in holding that an interest in a pyramiding sales scheme was a
security). For an explanation of Professor Coffey's formula see notes 40-41 and accom-
panying text infra.
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the language of the test in applying it to specific fact patterns.36 The
primary challenger to the Howey test is the risk capital theory first
expounded by Justice Traynor in SilverHills Country Club v. Sobieski. 37
In that case, the California supreme court found that membership in a
proposed country club was an investment contract under the California
securities act. 38 The court reasoned that securities laws should protect
an investor who was risking his capital in an enterprise over which he
had no control and from which he expected material benefits. 39
Professor Coffey, writing six years after the Silver Hills case, pro-
posed a refined test for the risk capital theory. 40 He argued that
securities laws should apply to a transaction in which (1) a person
furnishes initial value to another, (2) which is subjected to the risks of an
enterprise, (3) if, at the time of the transaction, the buyer was neither
familiar with the enterprise nor took part in its control, and (4) if the
seller induced the buyer to furnish initial value by promises or represen-
tations that a "valuable benefit of some kind, over and above initial
value," would accrue to the buyer. 4' Professor Coffey recognized that
his test parallels the Howey definition in material respects, but he
believed his formula is more consistent with the remedial nature of the
securities acts. He wrote that "the essence of the new look is found
particularly in [the sections] which highlight the troublesome prospect
that the buyer's original value could dwindle because of the failure of an
enterprise over which he exercises no control." 42
36. See, e.g., SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973) (holding that interests in pyramiding multilevel distributor-
ships were securities under the Howey test by finding the "solely" requirement satisfied if
the actions of the persons other than the investor were "those essential managerial efforts
which affect the failure or success of the enterprise"). See also SEC v. Koscot Inter-
planetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'g365 F. Supp. 588 (N.D. Ga. 1973). The
courts' adherence to the Howey test in these cases has been criticized. See Note, What is a
"Security"?, supra note 30, at 830-31.
37. 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961).
38. Id. at 815, 361 P.2d at 908-09, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188-89. The purchaser expected no
direct monetary gain from membership in the country club, only use of the facilities. Id. at
814, 361 P.2d at 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
39. Id. at 815, 361 P.2d at 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
40. Coffey, supra note 30, at 377.
41. Id.
42. Id. Both the Coffey test and Justice Traynor's reasoning in Silver Hills, see notes
37-39 and accompanying text supra, seem consistent with the remedial purpose of federal
and state securities laws. E.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 338 (1967); SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328
U.S. 293, 301 (1945). See also Long, supra note 30, at 177-78 n.177.
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The Second Circuit 43 and the Supreme Court" agreed that the Howey
definition controlled. The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the
court of appeals' conclusion that the shares represented investment
contracts. The Second Circuit had found that shareholders expected
profits from three sources: (1) the federal income tax deduction of the
portion of the monthly charge attributable to interest on the mortgage
loans ;45 (2) the availability of housing in the project at a price signifi-
cantly below the rent charged for comparable housing elsewhere;46 and,
(3) the income derived by the shareholders from space rented to stores
and businesses.' The Supreme Court said that profits could be found
only when there is "capital appreciation resulting from the development
43. Forman v. Community Servs., Inc., 500 F.2d 1246, 1253 (2d Cir. 1974).
44. 421 U.S. at 852.
45. Id. at 855. The deductions were based on INT. REV. CODEOF 1954 § 216,26 U.S.C. §
216 (1970). The Court said: "These tax benefits are nothing more than that which is
available to any homeowner who pays interest on his mortgage." 421 U.S. at 855; accord,
Eckstein v. United States, 452 F.2d 1036 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
The dissent found that tax benefits were profits to the cooperator and homeowner alike.
"The difference is that the profit of the individual homeowner does not 'come solely from
the efforts of others' whereas the profit from this source realized by a resident of Co-op
City does." 421 U.S. at 854 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The majority concluded, however,
that even if tax benefits were construed to be profits, it would be difficult to find that such
benefits came "solely from the efforts of others." Id. at 854 n.20. See also Rosenbaum,
The Resort Condominium and the Federal Securities Laws-A Case Study in Governmen-
tal Inflexibility, 60 VA. L. REV. 785, 795-96 (1974).
46. 421 U.S. at 855.
The low rent derives from the substantial financial subsidies provided by the State of
New York. This benefit cannot be liquidated into cash; nor does it result from the
managerial efforts of others. In a real sense, it no more embodies the attributes of
income or profits than do welfare benefits, food stamps or other government
subsidies.
Id. Again, the dissent disagreed.
It is simply common sense that managerial efficiency necessarily enters into the
equation in the determination of the charges assessed against residents. But even to
the extent that the resident-stockholders do benefit in reduced charges from govern-
ment subsidies, the benefit is not for this reason any the less a profit to them.
Id. at 861.
47. Id. at 855. The Second Circuit found that retail stores in the project paid about
$1,106,000 annually in rent. Washing machine concessions and leases of office space
produced about $667,000. Tenants and others paid about $2,500,000 annually in parking
fees. Community Servs., Inc. v. Forman, 500 F.2d 1246,1254 (2d Cir. 1974). The Supreme
Court believed that gross figures, without more, were unacceptable for a determination of
profit since "nothing in the record suggests that the facilities in fact return a profit in the
sense that the leasing fees are greater than the actual cost to Co-op City of the space
rented." 421 U.S. at 856. The Court noted also, with apparent approval, the observation of
one student commenting on the decision of the Second Circuit that income from these
facilities could be viewed not as profit, but as "a rebate on the cost of goods and services
purchased at these facilities since it appears likely that they are patronized almost
exclusively by Co-op City residents." Id., citing 53 TEXAS L. REV. 623,630-31 n.38 (1975).
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of the initial investment. . . or a participation in earnings resulting from
the use of investors' funds ... "48
Nor did the Court believe that adoption of the risk capital theory
would lead to a different result.49 It said:
Even if we were inclined to adopt such a 'risk capital' approach we
would not apply it in the present case. Purchasers of apartments in
48. 421 U.S. at 856. The Court, in formulating this definition, said that only profits
realizable in a monetary sense, through either capital appreciation or participation in
earnings, were characteristics of other schemes held to be investment contracts. Id., citing
SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943) (holding that the sale of oil leases
with an agreement by the promoter to drill exploratory wells was an investment contract)
and Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967) (holding that dividends based on a savings
and loan association's profits were part of an investment contract).
In excluding Forman from this definition, the Court stated:
There is no doubt that purchasers in this housing cooperative sought to obtain a
decent home at an attractive price. But that type of economic interest characterizes
every form of commercial dealing. What distinguishes a security transaction-and
what is absent here-is an investment where one parts with his money in the hope of
receiving profits from the efforts of others, and not where he purchases a commodity
for personal consumption or living quarters for personal use.
421 U.S. at 858.
This language stressing that Co-op City tenants purchased interests in homes with no
profit motivation may cast doubt on the Second Circuit's decision in 1050 Tenants Corp. v.
Jakobson, 503 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir. 1974), decided soon after the Forman decision. In
Jakobson the Second Circuit distinguished Forman because tenants' shares were not
subject to the restrictions present in Co-op City and because "there is a 'profit' element
here that was notably absent in Forman: the shareholder-tenants of 1050 Corp. have the
expectation of capital appreciation on a resale of their stock." Id. at 1378. Whether the
expectation of appreciation would be sufficient to satisfy the Supreme Court after Forman
may well be determined by whether a profit motive was clearly present in both the
marketing and the purchase of cooperative interests.
This is in accord with SEC Securities Act Release No. 5347 (Jan. 4, 1973). Aiming
primarily at resort condominiums, the Commission said that federal securities laws would
apply to "the offer and sale of condominium units, or other units in a real estate
development, coupled with an offer or agreement to perform or arrange certain rental or
other services for the purchaser." The release stresses the situations in which interests
"are offered and sold through advertising, sales literature, promotional schemes or oral
representations which emphasize the economic benefits to the purchaserto be derived from
the managerial efforts of the promoter. . .in renting the units." Id. (emphasis added).
49. 421 U.S. at 857 n.24.
Some states have adopted the risk capital theory in situations analogous to cooperative
apartments. See Lundquist v. American Campgrounds, Inc., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 71,196
(Wash. Super. Ct., Oct. 30, 1973) (holding that membership in a campsite constituted a
security); Ga. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 73-25, 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. T 71,213 (1973) (finding that
memberships in a lake campsite project were securities). The California Commissioner of
Corporations began treating community apartments, including condominiums and
cooperatives, as securities after the Silver Hills decision. Sobieski, Securities Regulation
in California, 11 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1963). Contra, Willmont v. Tellone, 137 So. 2d
610 (Fla. Ct. App. 1962); Brothers v. McMahon, 355 II. App. 321, 115 N.E.2d 116 (1953);
State v. Silverberg, 166 Ohio 101, 139 N.E.2d 342 (1956); Ariz. Op. Att'y Gen., Aug. 11,
1961 in [1954-1971 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP. 70,554.
[Vol. 12:277
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol12/iss1/14
COOPERATIVE HOUSING SHARES
Co-op City take no risk in any significant sense. If dissatisfied with
their apartments, they may recover their initial investment in
full. . . .[I]n view of the fact that the State has financed over 92%
of the cost of construction and carefully regulates the development
and operation of the project, bankruptcy in the normal sense is an
unrealistic possibility.'
This analysis, however, seems to ignore the fact that state-financed
projects are subject to failure just like privately funded projects if
income can no longer meet expenses. In fact, foreclosure proceedings
were commenced against Co-op City a short time after the Supreme
Court ruled on the case.5'
Professor Coffey's analysis presents a different view of cooperative
ownership. He suggests that there is a risk factor even though a
cooperative shareholder is getting back a valuable commodity in the
form of a long-term lease in exchange for his initial investment.12 Coffey
reasons that purchasers who supplied the initial value for a project did
so in anticipation of the future value of a successful community apart-
ment venture. 53 The facts in Forman indicate that risks are present in a
cooperative project and may significantly affect future value.54 As
Justice Traynor wrote in Silver Hills: "Only because [the buyer] risks
his capital along with other purchasers can there be any chance that the
benefits . . . will materialize."
5
Despite an appealing argument based on the risk capital theory for
inclusion of cooperative interests under the umbrella of securities
regulation, the question remains whether such a result would provide
desirable consumer protection. This depends largely on whether full
disclosure would effectively protect cooperative shareholders'
interests.
50. 421 U.S. at 857 n.24.
51. Bankruptcy is a very real possibility for Co-op City. The New York State Housing
Finance Agency began foreclosure action against the massive development in August
1975. About 11,500 of the more than 15,000 tenants had refused to pay an increase of 25 per
cent in the monthly assessment, leading to an $8,500,000 deficit in payment on the
mortgage notes. The increase was attributable to rising maintenance and fuel costs. Other
state-financed projects also have faced difficulty because of rising maintenance costs,
even without rent strikes. 3 HousING & DEv. REP.-CRRENT DEv. 286 (1975).
52. Coffey, supra note 30, at 399-400.
53. Id. Even with the required risk, however, many cooperative projects should not
come under the purview of the securities acts in Coffey's view. This is because each tenant
in a smaller cooperative has a measure of control over the entire project. Id. In the factual
setting of Forman such control is not present. Each of the more than 15,000 tenants had a
single vote in corporate affairs. 421 U.S. at 842.
54. See note 51 supra.
55. 55 Cal. 2d at 815, 361 P.2d at 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
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Full disclosure, the major requirement of federal and most state
securities laws, 56 has been criticized as ineffective in many commercial
settings.57 Disclosure can be effective among sophisticated parties. But
it can be particularly ineffective when an unsophisticated consumer is
dealing directly with a sophisticated seller. Even if the seller fully
discloses the nature of the transaction, the consumer may still come
away with little knowledge of what he has purchased and what risks he is
taking. 8
This analysis seems particularly appropriate in considering interests
in living units .5 9 A "sweetheart" lease, weak tenant-corporation bylaws
or an exorbitant mortgage loan, even if fully disclosed, nonetheless can
catch an unsuspecting purchaser by surprise and severely impair his
interests.60
One alternative to regulation under the securities laws is the type of
legislation passed recently in Florida. 61 That state has adopted signifi-
56. See 1 Loss, supra note 12, at 21; SEC, REPORT ON DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS-A
REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDERTHE '33 AND '34 ACTS 10, 49-54
(CCH ed. 1969) (commonly known as the Wheat Report) [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON
DIscLOsuRE TO INVESTORS]; Knauss, A Reappraisal of the Role of Disclosure, 62 MICH. L.
REV. 607 (1964).
57. "[T]here has been in the securities field a rising belief that disclosure as a
philosophy of federal securities regulation may not be enough, that more stringent
measures are necessary to protect the public against the blandishments of the huckster,
the lures of quick riches, the irrationalities that often intrude into the securities markets."
Sommer, Random Thoughts on Disclosure as "Consumer" Protection, 27 Bus. LAW. 85
(1971). See also REPORTON DISCLOSURETO INVESTORS, supra note 56, at 55-57; Kripke, The
Myth of the Informed Layman, 28 Bus. LAW. 631, 632 (1973); Note, Condominiun
Regulation, supra note 2, at 666-69.
58. Cf. Kripke, supra note 57, at 632 ("My theme is that the theory that the prospectus
can be and is used by the lay investor is a myth."). This critique of full disclosure
requirements may be less important in states that allow their commissioners of corpora-
tions more latitude in determining whether the proposed security offering should be
registered. Some states give the commissioners power to determine whether the offering is
fair, just and equitable before registration. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 25140 (Deering
Supp. 1975); Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 409.306(a)(2)(E)(ii) (Vernon Supp. 1976); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 421:27, 421:29 (1968); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.13 (Page 1964).
59. Cf. Case & Jester, Securities Regulation of Interstate Land Sales and Real Estate
Development-A Blue Sky Administrator's Viewpoint: Part II, 7 URBAN LAW. 385, 443
(1975) (the full disclosure provisions of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1701-20 (1970), are ineffective in regulating sales of land because of "the inherent
incapacity of full disclosure and private enforcement mechanisms, no matter how well
constructed, to deal with the economic realities of the problem without additional support
from, if not principal emphasis upon, substantive administrative regulation").
60. A second issue in considering the effectiveness of securities regulation is whether
the state and federal regulatory agencies are capable of handling the peculiar problems
presented by community apartments. See Note, Cooperative Housing Corporations,
supra note 3, a, at 124.
61. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 711.01-.72 (Supp. 1975).
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cant substantive requirements for cooperatives, whether publicly or
privately financed. The legislation, encompassing both cooperatives
and condominiums, is a "balance of direct substantive regulation and
the more typical disclosure provisions." 62 As an example of its substan-
tive requirements, the statute provides a specific timetable for assump-
tion of control by tenants. 63 It provides also for cancellation of contracts
and agreements that were made before the tenants assumed control.6
Regardless of whether cancellation is possible, the statute requires that
all contracts and agreements be "fair and reasonable." 65 Recreational
facilities or other common areas subject to "sweetheart" leases maybe
purchased by the tenant corporation at its option, at a price set by
agreement or by arbitration.' If monthly assessments set by the corpo-
ration board exceed 115% of those for the previous year, tenants may
call a special meeting and may adopt a new budget. 67
The Florida statute also provides for regulation of deposits placed in
escrow, with criminal penalties for misuse of funds.68 For the consumer,
there is a right to damages and rescission if there is "reasonable reliance
upon any material statement or information that is false or misleading
published by or under authority from the developer .... "69
The Florida statute, although perhaps not as stringent as it could be in
certain respects, 70 is a good attempt at setting specific minimum stand-
ards for community apartments, whether cooperatives or condo-
miniums. 7' Other states have some of the substantive provisions in
62. Note, Condominium Regulation, supra note 2, at 671. The disclosure provisions
are found in FLA. STAT. ANN. § 711.69 (Supp. 1975).
63. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 711.66(1) (Supp. 1975).
64. Id. § 711.66(5).
65. Id.
66. Id. § 711.63(7)(a). Arbitration would be conducted under the Florida Arbitration
Code, id. §§ 682.01-.22.
67. Id. § 711.44.
68. Id. § 711.67.
69. Id. § 711.71(1). These anti-fraud provisions are substantially different from the
federal provisions, see note 12 supra, primarily in regard to the necessity in Florida of
"reasonable reliance" and the apparent lack of a remedy in the case of an omission of a
material fact. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 711.71 (Supp. 1975). The anti-fraud provisions seem to be
the weakest link in the Florida regulatory scheme. Cf. FLORIDA SALE OF SECURMEs LAW,
id. §§ 517.01-.33 (1972), which specifically adopts the federal anti-fraud provisions.
70. See note 69 supra.
71. The Florida statute has been criticized as inadequate by one commentator, insofar
as it continues to rely in part upon full disclosure for consumer protection. Note,
Condominium Regulation, supra note 2, at 671-74. The author urges instead that a permit
system be established under a state regulatory body, whereby experts in the administra-
tive agency would have the power to approve a specific project. To achieve uniformity,
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their basic condominium legislation, 72 but none has a similar scheme of
substantive regulation for cooperatives.
73
The decision in Forman, with its emphasis on the nonprofit nature of a
state-assisted housing project, may do little more than heighten the
debate on whether privately financed community apartment interests
should be considered securities. 74 Despite the academic appeal of this
issue,75 it begs the more important question. Securities regulation pro-
vides certain remedies, 76 but it does not necessarily encourage adequate
housing for consumers. 77 By statutorily defining certain minimum stand-
the author suggests that the federal government adopt minimum standards and provide
financial assistance to those states that adopt the same or more stringent standards. Id.
Such federal legislation would be similar to the proposed Condominium Consumer
Protection Act (which was not drafted to include cooperatives) introduced in August 1975
by Senators Proxmire, Brooke and Biden. S. 2273, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975).
The need for establishing federal minimum standards is not clear. Recent surveys
showed that complaints most often cited by tenants and tenant associations were: (1)
shoddy and sloppy construction, (2) covenants and restrictions that were difficult to
understand, (3) insufficient soundproofing, (4) inadequate parking, and (5) substandard
maintenance and management. I HUD REPORT, supra note 1, Tables V-8 & V-9, at V-43.
Most of those complaints relate to specific provisions of the community apartment project
itself and seem to be inappropriate subjects for federal regulation. Nor is it clear that these
problems are sufficiently severe to warrant establishment of a federal system of regula-
tion. Ninety-five per cent of condominium and cooperative owners surveyed recently said
they were satisfied or very satisfied with their homes. Id. at V-43. It may be significant that
nowhere in the HUD REPORT, supra note 1, on condominiums and cooperatives is federal
legislation advocated by the agency.
The statistics cited above should not be read as negating the need for substantive
regulation. The same surveys indicated that 26.9% of all unit holders felt they had been
misled in various respects by the developers, particularly regarding maintenance, manage-
ment and recreation costs. I HUD REPORT, supra note I, Tables V-21 & V-22, at V-54.
Thirty-four per cent of all owners said developers' estimates of common expenses were
significantly low. Id., Tables V-18, V-19 & V-20, at V-52 to V-53. The number complaining
about insufficient estimates increased as family income decreased. Id., Table V-19, at
V-53.
72. For a compilation of state condominium statutes see I HUD REPORT, supra note- 1,
Table VI-1, at VI-27 to VI-I17. This legislation has been described as generally inade-
quate. Note, Condominium Regulation, supra note 2, at 646-50.
73. For a discussion of state and federal regulation applicable to various aspects of
cooperatives see ROHAN, supra note I, at §§ 3.01-.06(5).
74. See note 48 supra.
75. The line between a real estate offering, in its simple form clearly outside the scope
of the securities acts, and an investment contract involving real estate is often difficult to
draw. See I Loss, supra note 12, at 492-94; Coffey, supra note 30, at 399-400; Miller, supra
note 1; Note, Cooperative Housing Corporations, supra note 3; Note, Condominium
Regulation, supra note 2, at 650-56.
76. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1970).
77. The impact on cooperative developers of the type of legislation discussed herein,
see notes 61-69 and accompanying text supra, is difficult to gauge. The Florida statute did
not become effective until Oct. 1, 1974, Fla. Laws 1974, c. 74-104, § 19, and it is doubtful
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ards in community apartment projects, legislatures would go far
toward making these forms of housing even more attractive and benefi-
cial to the consumer.
David W. Martin
that the statute will have a significant effect on cooperatives since few have been built in
that state since 1970. Florida has about 9% (or 40,000) of the nation's stock of cooperative
units. I HUD REPORT, supra note 1, Table 111- 13, at IH-17. Only 5000 units were built in the
16-state southern region between 1970 and 1974, id., Table III-11, at 111-13, and it is
doubtful that the number built in 1975 is significant.
Statutes based on the Florida model should not deter development. The substantive
regulation is minimal and should not add significantly to a developer's costs. The
disclosure provisions, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 711.69 (Supp. 1975), may involve additional
cost, but the increase should not be significant.
The substantive regulations may change developers' sources of profits. Instead of
permitting a developer to rely on long-term management contracts and extended leases,
substantive regulations like Florida's will require that a developer take his profits directly
from the sale of cooperative shares.
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